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ABSTRACT: The improvement of tax compliance in Indonesia has not resulted in 
increase of tax ratio of the same year. From this perspective, the researchers 
conducted a study on voluntary tax compliance using theory of slippery slope.  
This study aims to provide an empirical evidence on the potential influence of tax 
audits, tax rewards, and trust in tax authority towards voluntary tax compliance. 
The study was conducted on Corporate Taxpayers who were registered as PKP 
(Taxable Enterprise). Structural Equation Modeling-Partial Least Square (SEM-PLS) 
was employed as the analytical tool in the study. Our empirical findings show that 
tax audits could influence voluntary tax compliance and trust in tax authority was 
proven successful to reduce the influence of tax audit towards voluntary tax 
compliance. However, other findings also show that rewards were not proven 
successful in influencing voluntary tax compliance.  
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Introduction 
 
In 2015, Indonesian Tax Authority started to show activities in educating 
and disseminating information to its citizens to pay their taxes. One activity 
that attracted most public’s interest was tax amnesty. Tax amnesty is 
implemented to meet the target of the Directorate General of Taxation 
(DGT) i.e. contribute of over 70% in State Budget (Directorate General of 
Taxation, 2016). As such, such target indicated that tax started to become 
the main pillar of state revenue. 
 
There are a lot of studies on tax compliance. Tax compliance is still an issue 
in Indonesia, in that Indonesia was ranked eighth in ASEAN in 2017 and 
126th in the world in tax compliance. There are studies conducted by OECD 
(2016), World Bank (2015), World Bank (2016 & 2017) regarding tax 
compliance in several countries in the world (Table 1). While Indonesia’s tax 
compliance has improved since 2015, its tax ratio however shows a decline 
in the pertaining year. Table 2 shows that Indonesia’s tax ratio experienced 
a decrease by 0.40% indicating that Indonesia’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) experienced an increase that was not proportional to the increase in 
tax payment. 
 
The above tax ratio shows that improvement in tax compliance and tax 
amnesty performance applied byIndonesian government has yet been 
successful in meeting the target of tax increase. Since 2015, Indonesian 
government has strived to improve its tax compliance by drawing up 
strategic plans 2015-2019. The current phenomenon suggests that tax 
compliance has been increasing every year, its tax revenue however  shows 
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             Table 1 Ranking of State Tax Compliance across Southeast Asian countries  
No. Country 
2015 2016 2017 
TC (%) Rank TC (%) Rank TC (%) Rank 
1 Singapura 97.19 5 96.56 5 97.99 5 
2 Brunei D. 84.40 30 89.61 16 91.36 16 
3 Malaysia 83.95 32 84.31 31 84.16 34 
4 Thailand 77.90 62 77.70 70 75.80 81 
5 Kamboja 73.06 90 73.06 93 73.06 97 
6 Filipina 66.46 127 66.23 126 71.06 110 
7 Myanmar 68.64 116 74.80 84 70.03 112 
8 Indonesia 53.66 160 60.46 148 66.83 126 
9 Laos 66.10 129 66.10 127 66.06 129 
  Note: TC = Tax Compliance, Rank = World Ranking of Tax Compliance 
  Source: The World Bank 
 
that it has yet to catch up with the increase in GDP resulting in a decrease in 
the tax ratio. 
 
The government puts a major concern on the strategy to increase tax 
compliance and tax ratio as tax is the central pillar of state revenue. The 
need to increase tax revenue has forced the government to pay more 
attention to issues that influence the increase in tax compliance and tax 
ratio. The rules and behavior of tax authorities are some of the issues that 
may influence tax compliance (Ratmono & Cahyonowati, 2013). On the 
other hand, increasing voluntary tax compliance may lead to an increase in 
state tax ratio (Gangl, Hofmann & Kirchler, 2015; Kirchler, Hoelzl & Wahl, 
2008). Kirchler et al. (2008) further explained that voluntary tax compliance 
could sustain tax compliance for longer period. The reason is that voluntary 
tax compliance tends to be compliant due to a high level of trust in tax and 
government authorities so that tax compliance may be maintained for a 
longer period. (Gangl et al., 2015; Kirchler et al., 2008).  
 
Tax audit is selected as one variable because previous studies of both of 
these variables showed inconsistent results. Finding from a study conducted 
by Slemrod, Blumenthal and Christian (2001) using close examination 
indicates that close examination could increase tax compliance only to low 
to medium taxpayers but it reduced tax compliance to large taxpayers.  
 
 
    Table 2 Tax Ratio across Southeast Asia countries 
Country 
Year 
2015 (%) 2016 (%) 
Singapura 13.60 14.30 
Malaysia 15.30 13.80 
Thailand 16.50 15.70 
Kamboja 14.20 15.30 
Filipina 13.00 13.70 
Myanmar 6.00 6.40 
Indonesia 10.70 10.30 
    Source: The World Bank 
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Reward is selected as a variable of coercive authority as the researchers 
would like to analyze the extent to which the tax authority in Indonesia 
values its taxpayers who contributed part of their income for tax. A study by 
Mahadianto and Astuti (2017) using privileged tax and testing the tax 
compliance found that privileged tax could increase tax compliance. The 
theory of slippery slope presents an argument from consequences 
traditionally conceptualized as an informal fallacy, Kirchler et al. (2008) 
speculated on the dynamic relationship between authority and trust but 
they had not provided further explanation on the potential interaction 
between authority and trust. Afterwards, Gangl et al. (2015) explained the 
possibility that interaction between authorities and trust could weaken and 
strengthen each other at a certain level. 
 
This study is a modification of a study by Gangl et al. (2015) by way of 
reducing the dependent variable to only voluntary tax compliance. Such 
reduction was taken because the researchers wanted to focus on voluntary 
tax compliance which is more consistent in complying. In addition, based on 
the researchers’ knowledge, that there have not been many studies on 
voluntary tax compliance, especially in Indonesia. This study also details the 
independent variables as in Gangl et al. (2015), using coercive authority 
variable as a tax audit variable and a negative coercive authority, and using 
reward as a positive coercive authority variable.  
 
The development of theory on voluntary tax compliance in Slippery Slope 
may promote a new way of increasing tax compliance in Indonesia. 
Therefore, the researchers are motivated to conduct a study on voluntary 
tax compliance to provide a solution for the government in increasing 
voluntary tax compliance and tax ratio within the same period of time. Based 
on the above explanation, this study aims to provide empirical evidence 
regarding the influence of potential tax audit and tax reward on voluntary 
tax compliance. In addition, this study also provides empirical evidence on 
the influence of trust in tax authority as a moderating variable between 
variables of tax audits possibility on voluntary tax compliance.  
 
Findings of this study indicate that the potential tax audit may increase 
voluntary tax compliance. On the other hand, tax rewards presents a 
different result in which it actually reduced voluntary tax compliance. Results 
from moderation test showed that tax trust could reduce the influence of 
potential tax audits in influencing voluntary tax compliance. This study can 
provide input for the government as the government needs to increase 
voluntary tax compliance. In the theory of slippery slope, it is explained that 
increasing voluntary tax compliance can both improve tax compliance and 
tax ratios. Therefore, this study may serve as a solution for the government 
to increase tax ratio. 
 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Theory of Slippery Slope 
 
Issues of tax compliance raise various theories expected to become the 
solutions to increase state tax revenue. The emergence of theory of slippery 
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slope was motivated that tax compliance is not only about economic factors, 
but it is also social psychological factors. Kirchler et al. (2008) created a 
theoretical framework for slippery slope with two big dimensions, namely 
the power controlled by the tax authority and the trust of taxpayer on tax 
authority. The power controlled by tax authority is thought to have the 
capacity of improving tax compliance when viewed from an economic 
paradigm, it will improve tax compliance with force.  
 
The theory describes tax compliance by combining economic variables with 
social psychology variables. Previous studies on tax compliance tended to 
use economic variables (Kirchler et al., 2008), whereas its development also 
include psychological variables that influence tax compliance (Kirchler et al., 
2008). Kirchler et al. (2008) explained that voluntary tax compliance is 
influenced by two factors, namely economic factors and psychological 
factors. Economic factors are related to the authorization controlled by the 
tax authority, while psychological factors are related to the trust of the 
taxpayers. Other authorization controlled by the tax authority is the 
legitimate authorization. This authorization is intended to compel the public 
become active in supporting authority’s policies (Tyler, 2006; Tyler, 2010).  
 
Coercive authority in Gangl et al. (2015) consists of negative coercive 
authority i.e. tax audit and positive coercive authority i.e. reward given to 
taxpayers. The authors stated that tax audit was considered as negative 
coercive authority because it indicated authority's distrust towards 
taxpayers. Reward is a positive coercive authority. The authors stated that 
reward is a positive coercive authority because the authority respects 
taxpayers who were compliant.  
 
Kirchler et al. (2008) explained that trust in tax authority is a psychological 
variable that not only it is able to improve tax compliance, but also to 
maintain tax compliance. They also stated that it is likely that the dimension 
of power and trust has a dynamic relationship but they did not provide 
explanations on the interaction between strength and trust.  
 
Theory of Bureaucratic Reform 
 
The theory of bureaucratic reform describes systematic, integrated and 
comprehensive efforts to create good governance. Etymologically, 
bureaucracy consists of Bureau and cracy. The word ‘bureau’ originated 
from French which means a writing desk or a place where officials work, 
while ‘cracy’ originated from a decline of Greek i.e. to regulate (Albrow, 
1970). Good governance enables state governance mechanism to maintain a 
constructive synergy between the government, private sector, and 
community effectively and efficiently (Sedarmayanti, 2010).  
 
The Directorate General of Taxation (2015) explained that the government 
was to implement bureaucratic reform in taxation with targets and activities 
set in detail every year from one stage to the next. Henceforth, this reform 
was used to improve tax compliance implemented by the government for 
the next five years. The objective of bureaucratic reform was set to create a 
good governance. Based on a Decree of State Minister for State-Owned 
Enterprises No. EP-117/M-MBU/2002 (Negara, 2002) regarding implement-
tation of good governance practices in SOE, there is a set of good 
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governance principle which consists of five aspects, namely transparency, 
independence, accountability, responsibility, and fairness.  
 
Tax bureaucratic reform aims to create a clearer tax structure in carrying out 
functions of delegation and supervision as well as to produce tax service that 
are fast, accurate, fair, consistent and transparent. Bureaucratic reform is 
also intended to improve the compliance, awareness and participation of 
taxpayers within the taxation system to facilitate an increase in state tax 
revenue (Puspita, Subroto, & Baridwan, 2016).  
 
The Influence of Potential Tax Audit on Voluntary Tax Compliance 
 
Tax audit is one of the coercive authority variables of tax authority. The 
theory of slippery slope explains that voluntary tax compliance is influenced 
by authorization (coercive and legitimacy) which is controlled by the tax 
authority (Kirchler et al., 2008). Coercive authorization is the authorization 
controlled by the tax authority to force taxpayers to comply with tax 
regulation. Tax audit is a deterrence factor which is part of a coercive 
authorization that is negative. Negative coercive power indicates that there 
is a distrust of authority towards taxpayers therefore the taxpayers need to 
be audited (Gangl et al., 2015).  
 
Tax audit is also related to theory of bureaucracy reform. Theory of 
bureaucracy reform explains that there are systematic, integrated and 
comprehensive efforts to create good governance. Good governance 
enables state governance mechanism to maintain a constructive synergy 
between government, private sector, and community effectively and 
efficiently (Sedarmayanti, 2010). Based on the DGT's Performance Report 
2015, the Indonesian government through Ministry of Finance presented a 
plan to carry out reforms in taxation. Tax audit is certainly one part of the tax 
reform to make tax audit more effective, efficient, and on target. This topic 
has attracted researchers to conduct a study related to the potential tax 
audit in Indonesia in influencing voluntary tax compliance in Indonesia. 
  
As described in Gangl et al. (2015), potential tax audit may influence 
voluntary tax compliance because taxpayers tend to choose to comply 
rather than be proven to report taxation not-in-accordance and therefore 
must take a legal action. The potential tax audit may improve tax compliance 
described in an article by Mendoza, Wielhouwer, and Kirchler, (2017) who 
conducted a study that divided audit levels on a certain scale. The study 
showed that tax audits could increase tax compliance only to a certain level. 
The leveling is related to an inspection level in finding tax fraud in 
accordance with the taxation regulation in Austria. A study by Konrad, Lohse, 
and Qari (2016) of tax audits that divided face to face and not showed any 
results that tax compliance could increase by 80% with the possibility of face 
to face audit by the tax authority. Based on the argument in the theory of 
slippery slope and supported by the theory of corruption reform, it can be 
concluded that the potential tax audit may influence voluntary tax 
compliance if the inspection is carried out effectively, efficiently and on 
target. Therefore, the researchers state a hypothesis as follows:  
 
H1: Potential tax audit has a positive influence on voluntary tax compliance.  
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The Influence of Reward on Voluntary Tax Compliance 
 
Reward is one of coercive authority variables in the theory of slippery slope. 
As previously explained, the theory describes voluntary tax compliance 
influenced by the authorization controlled by the tax authority (Kirchler et 
al., 2008). Reward is part of the coercive authority which is positive because 
reward indicates that there is trust in authority towards taxpayers so that 
the taxpayers need to be rewarded for their previously compliancy with the 
tax (Gangl et al., 2015). The theory also explains that reward may improve 
the quality of relationship between the authority and taxpayers as taxpayers 
feel appreciated by the tax authority.  
 
Reward may be conducted in various forms and ways, depending on rules 
and creativity of authority of a country and a region. A reward may be given 
in the form of lottery prizes to compliant taxpayers, it can also provide 
privilege (privileges given with certain conditions) for compliancy, etc. 
Reward given as lottery prize may increase tax compliance if the chance to 
win such prizes falls around one to twenty-five (Alm, McClelland, & Schulze, 
1992). However, the effect is still unknown for less chances. Other study was 
carried out by providing information on the use of tax fund in every 
government activity or tax authority. Such activities may also improve tax 
compliance (Lamberton, De Neve, & Norton, 2013). In their article, Gangl et 
al. (2015) explained that rewards may influence voluntary tax compliance.  
 
Indonesian Minister of Finance No. 74/PMK.03/2012 (Finance, 2012) 
regulates taxpayers with certain criteria i.e. the right to receive an 
overpayment introduction. This regulation also sets the requirements to 
obtain these criteria to comply with the tax regulations for at least 3 
consecutive years and must be certified through a tax audit. This 
demonstrates that Indonesian government appreciates its compliant 
taxpayers by providing rewards in the form of pre -payment facilities to 
facilitate the return of excess tax payment. A study conducted by 
Mahadianto and Astuti (2017) tested a privileged tax on tax compliance 
using taxpayers within Pratama Tax Service Office (KPP) region in Cirebon 
city. The study found that privileged tax could increase tax compliance. 
Based on the argument of the slippery slope theory, it can be concluded that 
rewards in the form of pre-payment and lottery prize could influence 
voluntary tax compliance. Therefore, the study formulates a hypothesis as 
follows:  
 
H2: Reward has positive influence on voluntary tax compliance.  
 
 
The impact of trust in tax authority on the influence of potential tax 
audit and fair tax procedure on voluntary tax compliance 
 
Trust in tax authority and potential tax audits carry a dynamic relationship 
and can influence each other. In the conceptualization of theory of slippery 
slope, Kirchler et al. (2008) tried to speculate on the dynamic relationship 
between tax authority and trust but the study has not provided further 
explanation on the interactions that occurred between the authority and 
trust.  
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Trust is a psychological influence of taxpayers on tax authority, therefore if 
taxpayer believes in the tax authority, the community will indirectly and 
without difficulty comply with the tax authority. Gangl et al. (2015) stated 
that trust is important in social life and there is a broad agreement that trust 
is the willingness of individuals or groups to take a risk. The trust of 
taxpayers plays an important role in influencing the potential tax audit. 
Further, Gangl et al. (2015) explained the possibility of interaction between 
authorization and trust can weaken and strengthen reciprocally at a certain 
level.  
 
Gangl et al., (2015) also explained that the authorization represented by the 
possible tax audits could increase its influence on voluntary tax compliance 
with the trust of high taxpayers. Taxpayers need not be afraid to be 
examined or found payment errors and tax reporting because taxpayers 
have a trust in the tax authority, and can apply otherwise. A study by 
Ratmono and Cahyonowati (2013) elucidated that trust was yet to influence 
the interaction between potential tax audits on tax compliance. Ratmono 
and Cahyonowati (2013) explained that the trust level of taxpayers in 
Indonesia was still low therefore trust in tax authority could not influence tax 
audits and voluntary tax compliance.  
 
Gangl et al. (2015) indicated that trust in tax authority may have an influence 
on taxpayer’s decision related to potential tax audit. The data on voluntary 
tax compliance is still limited if it is related to potential tax audits and tax 
trust, so the researchers wanted to provide evidence in this study that the 
influence of trust in tax authority may have an effect (increase or decrease) 
on the interaction between potential tax audits of voluntary tax compliance. 
Based on the argument of the above slippery slope theory, it can be 
concluded that trust in tax authority can moderate the effect of potential tax 
audit and fairness of tax procedure on voluntary tax compliance. Therefore, 
this study formulates a hypothesis as follows:  
 
H3: Trust in tax authority moderates the effect of potential tax audit towards 
voluntary tax compliance.  
 
 
Research Method 
 
This study aims to examine factors that influence voluntary tax compliance. 
As such, this study is categorized as a causal study (Now & Bougie, 2013). 
The study was conducted in Indonesian Directorate General of Taxation 
which oversees the agency on taxation in Indonesia. Indonesia was chosen 
because the realization of its tax compliance has been improved but its tax 
ratio has been decreased in the last two years. 
 
Sample of the study is Corporate Taxpayers that have obtained the criteria 
for Taxable Entrepreneurs (PKP). This sampling was chosen because only PKP 
Taxpayer Agency that have reached a turnover of >IDR4.8 billion, and is 
obligated to provide periodic financial reports and tax audit conducted in 
accordance with the financial report audit procedures (Directorate General 
of Taxation, 2013). The researchers submitted a research permit to several 
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KPPs in the Malang region, but we only received a reply from Kepanjen Tax 
Office for a permission to conduct a study on taxpayers in the KPP area.  
 
Data collected in this study is primary i.e. the perception of taxpayers in the 
Regional Tax Office of Third Tax Office in East Java. The objective is to find 
out factors influencing taxpayers to become voluntary taxpayers. The data 
was collected using a questionnaire which consisted of research items 
(Brockmann, Genschel, & Seelkopf, 2016; Kastlunger, Lozza, Kirchler, & 
Schabmann, 2013; Kirchler et al., 2008).  
 
The variables observed in this study are variables related to the theory of 
slippery slope and theory of bureaucratic reform. They are consisted of 3 
variables, namely; independent variables, dependent variables, and 
moderating variables. The measurement of each variable employs a 7-point 
likert scale as this type of scale may be better received by respondents and 
has fairly good criteria in terms of validity, reliability of discrimination ability 
and stability (Budjiji, 2013). These seven likert scales are (1) Strongly 
Disagree (STS), (2) Disagree (TS), (3) Somewhat Disagree (ATS), (4) Neutral 
(N), (5) Somewhat Agree (US), (6) Agree (S) and (7) Strongly Agree (SS).  
 
Operational Definition of Variables 
 
Potential tax audit is a potential audit carried out by the tax authority on 
taxpayers to ensure that the tax paid is in accordance with the actual tax 
that must be paid. The audit is coded with AP. This study used the 
instruments used in previous studies namely Kastlunger et al. (2013). 
Rewards tax is something that the authority gives to taxpayers as a reward 
because taxpayers have complied with the tax regulations. This reward can 
be in the form of information on the use of brand tax revenue. The audit is 
coded with RP. This study used the instruments from several previous 
studies namely Brockmann et al. (2016). Trust in tax authority is a 
psychological factor in taxpayers influenced by various factors to ensure that 
the tax authority shall use the tax paid properly according to what the 
taxpayers expected. It is coded with TO. This study used the instruments 
from several previous studies namely Kastlunger et al. (2013). Voluntary tax 
compliance is the behavior of taxpayers who were willing to fulfill their tax 
obligations in the form of counting, depositing, and reporting their tax to the 
tax authority voluntarily. It is coded with VTC. This study used the 
instruments from several previous studies namely Kirchler et al. (2008).  
 
Method of Data Analysis 
 
Method of data analysis used to test the hypotheses is Structural equation 
modeling - Partial Least Square (SEM-PLS) and the study used Warp PLS 
version 6.0. The use of PLS compared to other statistical analysis tools in 
research is based on the type of study which is either to test or to develop a 
theory. According to Hair, Hult, Ringle, and Sarstedt (2016) the use of SEM-
PLS is more suitable for a study whose objective is to explain and predict a 
construct in research. This study strives to explore the theory of slippery 
slope by making the trust in authority as a moderating variable, therefore 
SEM-PLS is more suitable as a statistical analysis tool in this study.  
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           Table 3 Type of Moderation Variable 
Type of Moderation Variable Definition 
Quasi There is influence on the main effect 
There is interaction with the moderating effect 
Predictor There is influence on the main effect 
There is no interaction on the moderation effect 
Pure There is no influence on the main effect 
There is interaction with the moderating effect 
Homologizer There is no influence on the main effect 
There is no interaction on the moderation effect 
 
 
Hypotheses Testing 
 
Testing the hypotheses H1 to H3 is done using PLS. Testing H1 to H2 is testing 
the direct effect without moderation, while testing H3 is a test of the 
moderating effect. This moderation test uses Moderated Regression Analysis 
(MRA) using PLS testing tools (There are moderation provisions that might 
later be formed in this study, so that even if there is no significant influence 
testing the moderation effect will still be done. This study refers to the 
research article Sugiono (2004) to identify the types of moderating variables, 
shown in Table 3.  
 
This moderation test was carried out in two stages, namely testing before 
and after moderation. The test is illustrated in the following three formulas:  
 
1) η = ɣ 1 ξ 5 + ζ 1 (influence on the main effect)  
2) η = ɣ 1 ξ 1 * ξ 5 + ζ 1 (influence on the interaction of moderating effects)  
 
 
Next, the researchers identify moderating variable based on the criteria in 
table 3. Testing the hypotheses was conducted in the following methods:  
 
1) Determining the level of significance or critical value (α) i.e. equal to 5%.  
2) Comparing the significance of p value and coefficient direction. If the 
significance of p value ≤ 0.05 (5%) and the coefficient direction is in 
accordance with the direction specified in the hypotheses, the 
hypotheses are accepted, otherwise the hypotheses are rejected.  
 
 
Result and Discussion 
 
This study uses owner/persons in charge of taxation in companies that have 
a turnover of more than IDR4.8 billion per year as its respondents. The 
selection of respondents was chosen because the owner/persons in charge 
of taxation is part of the decision maker who influence the culture of tax 
compliance in a company. The owner/persons in charge of taxation can 
determine whether or not to comply with the tax regulation. 
 
The researcher distributed the questionnaire at KPP for ten days before June 
30, 2018. This is done because the Corporate Tax Objects submits their Tax 
Return (SPT) of Value Added Tax (PPN) and Article 23 Income Tax near the 
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30th of every month. The respondents who came to submit SPT on the day of 
the study were given a questionnaire in paper form and a link to fill out 
online questionnaire. The selection of respondents who came to submit this 
SPT was considered efficient because there was a 2017 Circular which 
explained that the fulfillment of tax obligations could only be done by the 
person in charge of the Corporate Taxpayer and/or the taxpayer's 
representative. Representative of the taxpayer is the person in charge who 
receives or is given the authority the by the taxpayer to be responsible and 
participates in the decision-making related to taxation as evidenced by 
power of attorney signed by the Corporate Taxpayer, or in such case, the 
director or owner of the Business Entity.  
 
Questionnaires were distributed in KPPs who were gave the study 
permission to contact and use their taxpayers as respondents. The 
researchers and fellow researchers distribute to the taxpayers who came to 
filled out the questionnaires during office hours. In addition, the researchers 
also use friendship networking to help find potential respondents. Friends of 
the researchers who work as accountants and in taxation office within 
Malang region were also asked to help filling out and distributing 
questionnaires to offices where their colleagues worked in offices that fit in 
the requirements of this study.  
 
The distributed questionnaires were divided into two forms, namely hard 
copy and online questionnaire. The division served to facilitate the 
respondents in filling out and collecting the data. Online questionnaires were 
provided by the researchers using Google docs facility. The total question-
naire distributed to KPP was 311 questionnaires. The distributed question-
naire is illustrated in table 4. Table 4 shows that the response rate of this 
study is 88.42%. We achieved good response rates because the researchers 
conducted approaches to research respondents who came to KPP and 
established good communication with KPP especially those in the front office 
area to help accelerate questionnaires distribution.  
 
Table 4 shows that there are unreturned 36 questionnaires. There are 11 
questionnaires that cannot be used because there are several unanswered 
questions and invalid answers (for example: the respondent answered 1 
from the beginning to the end of the question). There were 91 question-
naires that did not meet the requirements because the researchers 
conducted research on corporate taxpayers who had been confirmed as PKP 
(taxable enterprise) and were still active as PKP. These corporate taxpayers 
who filled out the questionnaire were out of these conditions, the 
questionnaire could not be used in this study. Table 5 shows the general 
description of the demographic characteristics of the respondents. 
 
        Table 4 Sample Distribution and Returned Questionnaire 
Description Total 
Questionnaires distributed offline 168 
Questionnaires distributed Online 143 
Unanswered questionnaires (36) 
Questionnaire that cannot be Led (11) 
Questionnaires that do not meet the requirements (91) 
Total questionnaire used in the Study 173 
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Table 5 Respondents’ Demographic Characteristics  
No. Category Number of Respondent % 
1 Men 58 33.52 
2 Women 106 61.27 
3 blank 9 5,.21 
Total 173 100 
1 < 20 years old 0  
2 21-30 years old 68 39.32 
3 31-40 years old 74 63.24 
4 41-50 years old 29 16.76 
5 >50 years old 2 1.16 
6 blank 9 5.2 
Total 173 100 
1 Owner 34 19.65 
2 Employee 118 68.21 
3 Tax consultant 12 6.93 
4 blank 9 5.2 
Total 173 100 
1 Brevet certified 128 73.98 
2 Non-Brevet certified 36 20.81 
3 blank 9 5.2 
Total 173 100 
 
 
As shown in Table 5, the number of female respondents is higher than that 
of men, and there are 9 respondents who did not fill in their gender 
information. The number indicates that there are still more women working 
within taxation sector. This difference will not have much effect on this study 
because the study focuses on voluntary compliance of corporate taxpayers.  
 
Based on Table 5, majority of our respondents were between 31-40 years 
old. We believe this is related to tax regulation in that it require only 
taxpayers or representative of taxpayers should manage the tax obligations. 
So only financial managers or people or employees in equivalent position 
who gained the trust from the taxpayers who reported their tax to KPP in 
accordance with the conditions set by the Directorate General of Taxation. 
  
Table 5 shows that only 6.93% of company owners carry out their own tax 
obligations to KPP. In addition, the majority of respondents who filled out 
the questionnaire were company employees. In accordance with Circular 
Letter No. SE/02.PJ/2017, employees who are allowed to carry out tax 
obligation are employees who already have a Special Power of Attorney 
from the Agency/Company, have worked more than 1 year (in the company), 
have taken taxation education namely brevet tax at least A, and become 
representatives companies in fulfilling tax obligations.  
 
Table 5 shows that 73.98% of respondents have taken tax education in the 
form of tax brevet. This is also related to the previous explanation about 
Circular Letter No. SE/02.PJ/2017 which requires employees appointed as 
the entity Taxpayers’ representatives to fulfill out tax obligations, must have 
taken brevet tax education proven by showing tax brevet certificates. 
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Table 6 Descriptive Statistics of Research Variables 
No. Variable Minimum Maximum (mean) Standard Deviation 
1 Audit probability 1 7 5.115 1.019 
2 Tax Rewards 1 7 3.412 0.917 
3 Trust 1 7 4.533 1.074 
4 Voluntary tax compliance 1 7 5.127 0.941 
 
 
The frequency of the answer values in each variable, mean value, and 
standard deviation are used as the basis for interpreting the responses of 
respondents. The value used in answering one variable consists of positive 
statements. Table 6 shows that all constructs had a minimum and maximum 
value of 1 and 7. The average value indicates that the respondent's answer 
of average potential tax audit is 5.115. Based on the indicator, this result 
indicates that the potential tax audit is quite high. In contrary, the average 
value of tax rewards i.e. 3.412, meaning that the respondents believed that 
the tax rewards was quite low. Finding from standard deviation shown falls 
in the range between maximum and minimum values, and the standard 
deviation value also does not exceed the average value of the study. This 
shows that the answers given by the respondents to a statement did not 
have a big difference. That is, the answers of each respondent tend to be 
consistent so that they can represent the entire data used in this study.  
 
Hypotheses Testing 
 
To test the hypotheses, the researcher used the PLS Regression WarpPLS 6.0 
algorithm with stable resampling method 3. The researchers chose stable 3 
because the resampling method produces an estimated standard errors 
(Kock, 2015) and p value (Kock, 2015) with the best precision compared to 
other resampling method. Testing the hypotheses in this study is divided 
into two stages, namely the stage of testing the hypotheses before 
moderation and after the moderating effect.  
 
All tests in the study used one-tailed hypotheses. The testing used p values 
because WarpPLS 6.0 is a statistical tool that produces one-tailed p values 
(Kock, 2015). The testing of hypotheses with moderating effects did not use 
direction (two-tailed consequences) so that the p value will be multiplied by 
two (Kock, 2015). Testing the p value is determined, if the significance of 
p<0.05, the hypothesis is accepted, and if the value of p> 0.05, the 
hypothesis is rejected. The results of hypotheses testing before modification 
are presented in table 7. 
 
A results of hypotheses testing is shown in table 7. One hypothesis is 
accepted i.e. H1 because it has the direction in accordance with the 
hypothesis (for variables with direction of research) and the p-value that is  
  
           Table 7 Hypotheses Test Results 
Hypotheses information Coefficient value P value Conclusion 
H1 AP  VTC 0.159 0.016* Accepted 
H2 RP  VTC -0.188 0.066* Refuted 
H3 AP*TO  VTC -0.277 <0.001** Accepted 
* = one-tailed; ** = two-tailed 
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          Table 8 Types of moderation effects 
Influence on main effect Influence on moderation effect 
Conclusion 
Information P value Information P value 
TO  VTC 0.006** 
AP*TO  VTC <0.001** Quasi 
KP*TO  VTC 0.016** Quasi 
           * = one-tailed; ** = two-tailed 
 
 
significantly below 0.05. Table 7 also shows that two moderation 
interactions are accepted, namely H3 with the possibility of tax audit and tax 
trust (AP*TO) because the p-value is significantly below 0.05. The 
hypotheses used testing without direction or two-tailed therefore the 
direction of coefficient value does not serves as a requisite for accepting the 
hypotheses. 
 
Other researcher tested the influence of moderating variables, i.e. the trust 
on tax authority on voluntary tax compliance to determine whether or not 
there was an influence on the main effect (moderating variable towards 
endogenous variables). Table 8 presents several types of moderating 
variables from an empirical testing. The determination of this type of 
moderation was based on the previous explanation.  
 
After conducting several stages of hypotheses testing, namely testing before 
moderation, testing the moderation interaction, and testing the main 
effects, the results of the study are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
The Influence of Potential Tax Audit on Voluntary Tax Compliance 
 
The results of this study provide empirical evidence that the potential tax 
audit has a significant influence on voluntary tax compliance. The coefficient 
value in this study shows positive value, which means that the higher the 
possibility of tax audit is, therefore the higher the voluntary tax compliance 
is. The results of this study support the results of research by Gangl et al. 
(2015), Mendoza et al. (2017), Konrad et al. (2016) which provides an 
empirical evidence that the higher the possibility taxpayers to be audited is, 
the more obedient the mandatory tax will  be  voluntarily.  The results of this 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  AP = Potential Tax Audit; TO = Tax trust; VTC = Voluntary tax compliance 
  Figure 1 Research Results 
 
AP VTC 
TO
O 
(H1) β= 0,159 
         p= 0,016 
(H5) β= -0,277 
         p <0,001 
R2 = 0,464 
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study are not in line with the research of Oestreich (2017) who did not find 
empirical evidence regarding the influence of potential tax audits on 
voluntary tax compliance.  
 
The results of this study support the theory of slippery slope in that tax 
authorities can use coercive authority to increase voluntary tax compliance. 
In this study, we explain in great detail about negative coercive authority by 
using the potential tax audits. Tax authorities can use their authority to 
conduct tax audit that taxpayers tend to avoid. For taxpayers who have PKP 
status, they will tend to avoid tax audits because this is also related to their 
PKP status. According to the Directorate General of Taxation (2013), PKP 
status of corporate taxpayers could be revoked if fraudulent acts were found 
during a tax audit and sanctions would be given materially and immaterial. 
Therefore, when the potential tax audit increases, voluntary tax compliance 
will increase.  
 
The results of this study also support the theory of bureaucratic reform in 
that the government's efforts to create a good governance by improving 
state governance. The goal is to maintain good synergy between tax 
authorities, taxpayers and the public as can be seen through the potential 
tax audits conducted by the tax authorities. With the improvement of good 
integrity and accounting and taxation capabilities of tax authorities, tax audit 
is increasingly becoming effective and efficient. Such improvement was 
responded positively by the taxpayers, especially PKP, who saw that if there 
were financial statements that were deemed not in accordance with 
regulations by the tax authorities, the potential tax audits would increase so 
that taxpayers preferred to comply voluntarily. This study shows that the 
potential tax audits can increase voluntary tax compliance.  
 
Effect of Tax Rewards on Voluntary Tax Compliance 
 
The results of this study are in line with the research conducted by Bazart 
and Pickhardt (2011), Brockmann et al. (2016), Fochmann and Kroll (2016) 
and Göx (2008) who found no empirical evidence related to rewards that 
affected voluntary tax compliance. Empirical evidence of this study does not 
support the results of research conducted by Feld, Frey, and Torgler (2006), 
Lamberton et al. (2013) Mahadianto and Astuti (2017), and Torgler (2003).  
 
The research conducted by Brockmann et al. (2016) was conducted via 
surrogate, namely students at Jacobs University, Germany. The research by 
Brockmann et al. (2016) explains that rewards using lottery prize failed to 
significantly increase tax compliance. Furthermore, they stated that the 
lottery was tested with the possibility of winning 1:100. The possibility of a 
small chance to win did not motivate the respondents to increase their 
voluntary tax compliance. The possibility of this win was also examined by 
Alm et al. (1992) who succeeded in providing evidence that rewards can 
improve the tax compliance better than tax audits. But the research of Alm 
et al. (1992), showed that the probability of winning is 1:25. A research 
conducted by Fochmann and Kroll (2016) describes the effect of rewards 
with certain criteria. Taxpayers can choose to report their taxes or donate a 
portion of their income for public interest. The results of the Fochmann and 
Kroll (2016) study explain that rewards had no effect on large tax 
compliance. This is because taxpayers will still be compliant even though 
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there are no rewards, while for compliance of low tax, the rewards in lottery 
prize will actually further reduce the level of tax compliance. This is because 
taxpayers will prefer to pay in the form of contributions for public interest in 
small amounts so that they do not need to report taxes. Researchers still find 
small research on the tax rewards made, especially tax rewards in Indonesia. 
In addition, the characteristics of taxpayers in Indonesia are certainly 
different those of other countries. 
 
Kepanjen KPP is one of KPPs with larger tax compliance. This is evidenced by 
the achievements of Kepanjen KPP that achieved the highest tax revenue 
target in East Java Regional Tax Directorate III. However, this KPP has yet to 
give rewards in the form of lottery prize to their taxpayers. Even though 
some KPPs have begun to implement rewards in lottery prize to attract 
taxpayers to comply as used by KPP Prata ma Purworejo (Editor, 2018). This 
can be one of the factors in tax rewards that have no effect on voluntary tax 
compliance.  
 
In relation to the privileges given by the Director General of Taxation as 
described in PMK No. 74/PMK.03/2012 (Finance, 2012), in order to become 
a taxpayer with certain criteria, one must meet the stipulated requirements. 
One of the requirements set in accordance with PMK is to undergo a tax 
report audit for the last three years. Some taxpayers tend to avoid tax audit 
mainly because the nature of Indonesian taxpayers who tend to avoid tax 
audits, while the rewards received were mainly an ease in returning excess 
tax payments. Such rewards is certainly not worth the effort to go through 
tax audit. This can also be one factor that rewards do not influence voluntary 
tax compliance.  
 
Impact of trust in tax authority on the influence of potential tax audit 
on voluntary tax compliance 
 
The third hypothesis is to examine the influence of trust in tax authority as a 
moderating variable in influencing the interaction of potential tax audit of 
voluntary tax compliance. This study succeeded in providing empirical 
evidence for the third hypothesis in that trust in tax authority can be a 
moderating variable significantly to the interaction of potential tax audits 
with voluntary tax compliance. The coefficient value shows a negative result, 
meaning that with the existence of trust in tax authority, it decreases the 
influence between the possibility of tax audits and voluntary tax compliance.  
 
The results of this study explain the influence of tax trust in the theory of 
slippery slope and in accordance with the arguments of Kirchler et al. (2008) 
which explained that trust greatly influences voluntary tax compliance and 
there is an interaction dimension between authority and trust in tax 
authority. This argument is explained by Gangl et al. (2015) that the 
dimension of interaction between coercive authority and procedural justice 
with the intended tax trust is the two variables can influence each other if 
the relation is a factor that influences voluntary tax compliance.  
 
Trust in tax authority greatly influences voluntary tax compliance (Kirchler et 
al., 2008). This is evidenced by the results of a study that provides empirical 
evidence that trust in tax authority has a significant influence on voluntary 
tax compliance. The coefficient value generated from this study shows a 
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positive result. This means that as trust in tax authrotiy increases, the 
voluntary tax compliance will also increase. However, as a moderating 
variable, the level of trust in tax authority of taxpayers must also be 
considered.  
 
In this study, the respondents’ answers in answering indicators on tax 
confidence variable results in average scores. This shows that the taxpayers' 
trust in Kepanjen KPP tends to be low. The result of this study are also the 
same as the result of research conducted by Ratmono and Cahyonowati 
(2013) which stated that trust in tax authority in Indonesia still tends to be 
low. The low of trust in tax authority may reduce the influence of potential 
tax audits in increasing voluntary tax compliance. 
 
For voluntary tax compliance, trust plays an important role for the taxpayers 
and the public to comply to voluntarily tax. The potential tax audit may 
improve tax compliance only for a certain period of time, but trust in tax 
authority can increase voluntary tax compliance, whose compliance may be 
last a longer period of time. The low taxes confidence can decrease the 
influence of potential inspection on voluntary tax compliance. This is 
because taxpayers tend to have a lack of trust in tax authorities, so efforts 
from the tax authorities to increase the potential taxes audit tend to be 
ignored. Taxpayers do not really care about the potential tax audits because 
they prioritize to conduct tax evasion neatly so when it is audited it cannot 
be detected by the tax authority.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
This study aims to analyze factors that influence voluntary tax compliance. 
Voluntary tax compliance is important to examine because such compliance 
not only increases tax compliance but can also provide a solution to improve 
the tax ratio. The variables examined in this study are potential tax audits, 
rewards and trust in tax authority. This research was conducted on taxpayers 
with PKP status at Kepanjen KPP in July 2018 with 173 samples.  
 
Results of this study an provide empirical evidence that potential effective 
and efficient tax audits may increase voluntary tax compliance. Result of this 
study provides support to theory of slippery slope and heuristic fairness 
theory that the authority of tax authority can legitimately increase voluntary 
tax compliance. In addition, procedural justice is also one of the factors that 
influence voluntary tax compliance. On the other hand, the researchers have 
not found empirical evidence that rewards can influence voluntary tax 
compliance. This may be due to the fact that the research location still does 
not carry out rewards as an activity used by the authorities to attract 
taxpayers to comply. Rewards are also not considered as something that 
significantly influence tax compliance in this study.  
 
Other results show that trust in tax authority can moderate the interaction 
between the potential tax audit of voluntary tax compliance. Although 
empirical evidence shows that trust in tax authority negatively influenced 
these interactions. This can occur if respondents in Kepanjen KPP area had 
tax beliefs that are still on average so that this can influence the taxpayer's 
decision to comply voluntarily. Implications of results of this study support 
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the theory of slippery slope, and heuristic fairness theory which explains that 
there is a dynamic interaction between trust in tax authority and the 
authority of tax authority that affects voluntary tax compliance.  
 
Implications of the study provides an empirical evidence related with the 
importance of trust in tax authority and the potential tax audit to improve 
tax compliance voluntarily. This serves as an input to tax authorities in KPP 
Kepanjen and the Government that the tax authorities carry the duty to 
improve the confidence in taxes and voluntary tax compliance so that it can 
help the government improve tax compliance voluntary and the tax ratio for 
long period of time. This can also provide a solution for the government to 
reach the target of 20% tax ratio by 2020 by increasing voluntary tax 
compliance. 
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